Can an increase in Sudanese withdrawals become a new source of conflict?

Hey everyone!

This will be a shorter post than usual, because it is more of an addition to my previous ones than a completely new aspect. As I was reading more about the issues surrounding the GERD, I noticed a point that came up several times (Cascao, Tawfik & Zeitoun, 2019, Heggy et al., 2021, Wheeler et al., 2020), and that I had not considered before: the potential increase in water withdrawals from Sudan due to the GERD, and the impact it might have on Egypt further downstream.


Indeed, as Heggy et al. explain, Sudan will benefit more from the GERD than Egypt because the dam regulate the flow of the Nile, enabling Sudan to increase its irrigated areas for example, and overall use more Nile water (up to 32 bcm annually according to current estimates) . As a reminder, Sudan is currently allocated 18.5 bcm annually, whereas Egypt gets 55.5 bcm, according to the 1959 agreement. However, Sudan currently does not use all of its share, which leads to Egypt using more than its share. While this situation is not problematic at the moment, I believe that it could quickly become a new point of tension between the downstream riparian countries, if Sudan starts withdrawing its allocated resources and potentially asking for more (or simply taking more?) as a result of the GERD.



Alfalfa crop in Sudan with Pivot irrigation, ICS


I was therefore quite surprised that, although these three papers mention the issue, it is not truly taken into account in their subsequent analysis. Indeed, Wheeler et al. consider different scenarios for the GERD filling and later operation, under normal and drought conditions, but do not add as a condition the potential increase in withdrawals from Sudan, as well as withdrawals from Egypt above the 55.5 threshold. Cascao, Tawfik & Zeitoun make an interesting addition to this point by highlighting the interest from several external actors, such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, to invest in Sudan’s largely underexploited arable land (18 million ha currently cultivated out of 105 million ha of arable land). 


In light of this information, I believe that Nile water withdrawals from Sudan is a crucial issue that has not yet received enough attention, as Egypt and Ethiopia’s more mediatised conflict has come under higher scrutiny. 

Comments

  1. Clement25 November 2021 at 13:53

    So this will be one comment covering the last three posts, where the focus has been the GERD and you have presented interesting perspectives about the subject of water and politics but also the ever shifting relation of power across the countries involved. The posts are well writtend and presented with good engagemen with literature. What are the local implication of evolving water sharing structure (75%/25%) between Sudan and Egypt? Will there be more transboundary issues between Egypt and Sudan going forward? Also, does Sudan stand to subvert Egypt agricultural productivity position in the region?

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    1. Water and Politics in Africa29 November 2021 at 14:49

      Thank you for all the comments Clement. I do believe that there will be more transboundary issues between Egypt and Sudan, related to water or not. The first one that comes to my mind is the territorial conflict over the Halayib triangle. However, Sudan and Egypt have been allied for many years and I believe that Egypt values this partnership, especially in order to counter Ethiopia on the GERD matter.
      Regarding the local implications, which you also mentioned in your previous comment, I have to say that I don't know much about them, and I doubt that I will be able to make a specific post about it, but it is definitely a very interesting aspect that I will try to learn more about.

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