Conclusion: public perceptions and the way forward for Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia

Welcome to my last post!


Throughout this blog, I have tried to understand the hydropolitical challenges of the Nile basin, especially linked with the GERD. There is a lot that I wasn’t able to cover, and this is what I will turn to in this last post.


One very interesting aspect that I couldn’t explore in more detail is the populations’ perceptions of the issue and how public reaction affects decision making in government. In Egypt for example, the strongly anchored belief that the GERD presents a mortal threat to the country means that every concession the government makes to Ethiopia further damages people’s trust in them. Wheeler et al. (2020) add a contribution from behavioural economics to argue that people feel losses stronger than gains, and that this skewed perception could have very negative impacts. Indeed, social media means that a ‘water panic’ in Egypt could spread very quickly and create a very unstable situation in the country. Furthermore, local and internal politics is a topic I have not touched upon. What will be the impact of the GERD on smallholder farmers in all three countries? What are the conflicts within each country around the GERD? Are there solutions being developed at a local level to manage water more efficiently? 


To conclude, although it seems clear to me that the only long-term solution is a comprehensive, basin-wide management plan, the road to reach it still holds countless challenges. Ethiopia has started filling the GERD unilaterally, Egypt refuses to give up its historical share of water, Sudan might try to become the agricultural hub in the region and increase its water withdrawals… Finally, the GERD will not be the last infrastructural project on the Nile. Will there be similar tensions for each new project? The only way forward is an agreement. But who can make it happen, now that Western and African institutions have failed? Could the NBI be the most relevant institution? Does the CFA have a future? Many questions remain, and I will keep following the news on this issue to try to find some answers.

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