Posts

Conclusion: public perceptions and the way forward for Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia

Welcome to my last post! Throughout this blog, I have tried to understand the hydropolitical challenges of the Nile basin, especially linked with the GERD. There is a lot that I wasn’t able to cover, and this is what I will turn to in this last post. One very interesting aspect that I couldn’t explore in more detail is the populations’ perceptions of the issue and how public reaction affects decision making in government. In Egypt for example, the strongly anchored belief that the GERD presents a mortal threat to the country means that every concession the government makes to Ethiopia further damages people’s trust in them. Wheeler et al. (2020) add a contribution from behavioural economics to argue that people feel losses stronger than gains, and that this skewed perception could have very negative impacts. Indeed, social media means that a ‘water panic’ in Egypt could spread very quickly and create a very unstable situation in the country. Furthermore, local and internal politics is

Towards a more sustainable management of water resources in Egypt

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  Hi everyone! Now that the GERD has become an undeniable fact and the filling has started, I would like to focus on what Egypt can do to ensure it has enough freshwater resources for the years to come. Indeed, while the GERD might cause water losses during the filling or drought periods, and a loss of power generation at the HAD, Egypt will also suffer from the combined impacts of climate change and population growth. All of these will accentuate the pressure on water resources, and a long-term strategy is needed in order to face these threats. Around 85% of water consumption in Egypt goes towards agriculture. Water access is therefore heavily linked to food production. There are three main ways for Egypt to increase the efficiency of its agricultural systems. The first one is to change crops and crop patterns. For example, rice is very water intensive, and replacing it with less intensive crops could save up to 1 bcm annually . Crop rotation is also crucial to maintain soil fert

The destabilising potential of foreign interests in the Nile basin

Welcome back! This post will take a wider look at foreign interests in the Nile basin and how different actors act in the region. The fact that so many external actors are involved in what initially seemed like a regional issue makes the need for basin-wide cooperation even more crucial, due to the added pressure it poses on the Nile.  According to the regional security complex theory , security issues can be clustered by region. This is the case in the Nile basin, where alliances are shifting because of the GERD, threatening to further destabilise the region. There are many instances of this, including a danger of civil war spillover from South Sudan and now from Tigray. However, one good example of the link between GERD and wider security issues is Egypt’s growing partnership with Eritrea . Indeed, as Egypt cooperates with Eritrea on security matters in the Red Sea, Eritrea supports Egypt’s position on the GERD and its historical rights to the Nile. This revives tensions between Eth

Can an increase in Sudanese withdrawals become a new source of conflict?

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Hey everyone! This will be a shorter post than usual, because it is more of an addition to my previous ones than a completely new aspect. As I was reading more about the issues surrounding the GERD, I noticed a point that came up several times ( Cascao, Tawfik & Zeitoun, 2019 , Heggy et al., 2021 , Wheeler et al., 2020 ), and that I had not considered before: the potential increase in water withdrawals from Sudan due to the GERD, and the impact it might have on Egypt further downstream. Indeed, as Heggy et al. explain, Sudan will benefit more from the GERD than Egypt because the dam regulate the flow of the Nile, enabling Sudan to increase its irrigated areas for example, and overall use more Nile water (up to 32 bcm annually according to current estimates) . As a reminder, Sudan is currently allocated 18.5 bcm annually, whereas Egypt gets 55.5 bcm, according to the 1959 agreement . However, Sudan currently does not use all of its share, which leads to Egypt using more than its s

Why cooperation? A benefit-sharing approach to the GERD

Today, I want to look at a topic not directly related to the GERD, but crucial to understanding the true impact it could have on the region if a proper agreement can be reached. In other words, why is it so important that Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan come to an agreement on the GERD? Apart from the obvious benefits of avoiding war and preserving each country’s water security, there are many advantages of establishing a comprehensive framework to manage Nile waters, which could go much further than the water itself. Sadoff and Grey (2002) have categorised the potential benefits of collaboration for riparian countries: Benefits to the river: cooperation leads to a better protection of the ecosystem and a more sustainable use of the water.  Benefits from the river: increased food or energy production linked with the dam (or other projects). Reduction of costs because of the river: agreement on water management leads to less tensions overall and forms the basis for future collaboration. B

The GERD: a representation of failed cooperation efforts in the Nile basin

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Hello again! In the past weeks, I’ve tried to give some background on the relations between Eastern Nile countries, and their points of view on the GERD. Today, I will focus more specifically on the cooperation efforts, asking myself why have they all failed? I would argue that it is due to a mixed set of reasons, including historical developments (colonisation as well as internal instability in the past few decades), pragmatic security concerns over water, and the importance of the Nile and the GERD in Egypt and Ethiopia’s national identities.  Throughout your reading, you can refer to the infographics below, in which I have summarised the main stages in the cooperation efforts, from 1959 until 2020.  First of all, I would like to mention Gebresenbet and Wondemagegnehu’s paper on the ontological dimension of the GERD. According to the authors, the Nile has been a cornerstone of Egyptian identity since the Pharaonic era, and perhaps the only continuity in Egypt’s history. For Ethiopia

Why is the GERD such a conflictual project?

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  Map of the Nile basin showing major infrastructure, with active reservoir storage volumes shown for each location, ( Wheeler, K.G., Jeuland, M., Hall, J.W. et al, 2020 ). It is interesting to note that the expected reservoir storage volume for the GERD has increased from 14 to 74 bcm . Hello everyone! After having a look at the historical relations between Egypt Sudan and Ethiopia, I wanted to understand why the GERD specifically is such a controversial project. Indeed, it is far from being the first dam on the Nile, and will probably not be the last. So what are Egypt's, Ethiopia’s and Sudan’s positions on the issue? There are many expected benefits and risks of the GERD, for all three countries involved. For Ethiopia, it is clear that the production of electricity through the dam will boost the economic development of the country. Indeed, the dam will produce more than 6,000 megawatts , which Ethiopia intends to use, but also to export, as part of its strategy to become an ener