The GERD: a representation of failed cooperation efforts in the Nile basin

Hello again!

In the past weeks, I’ve tried to give some background on the relations between Eastern Nile countries, and their points of view on the GERD. Today, I will focus more specifically on the cooperation efforts, asking myself why have they all failed? I would argue that it is due to a mixed set of reasons, including historical developments (colonisation as well as internal instability in the past few decades), pragmatic security concerns over water, and the importance of the Nile and the GERD in Egypt and Ethiopia’s national identities. 

Throughout your reading, you can refer to the infographics below, in which I have summarised the main stages in the cooperation efforts, from 1959 until 2020. 

First of all, I would like to mention Gebresenbet and Wondemagegnehu’s paper on the ontological dimension of the GERD. According to the authors, the Nile has been a cornerstone of Egyptian identity since the Pharaonic era, and perhaps the only continuity in Egypt’s history. For Ethiopia, the Nile, and the GERD more specifically, represent a chance at building a new national identity, above existing ethnic and religious identities which divide the country. The project therefore carries a strong emotional impact, which in my opinion should not be forgotten, and that I will try to link to the different cooperation attempts throughout this post.

It is interesting to see that the first dam projects, including the Border dam, on the location of the current GERD, were initiated through the NBI. To me, this really highlights the missed opportunity for cooperation and for a comprehensive framework that the unilateral launch of the GERD represents. However, the decision in 2009 by 6 countries to sign the CFA seemed too rushed for Egypt, as not all clauses had been agreed on. This led Egypt and Sudan to freeze their participation in the NBI, which was the first main failed attempt at cooperation. Following this, Ethiopia, which had hoped that Egypt would contribute to 30% of the costs of the dam and Sudan to 20%, had to fund its dam project on its own, giving it a new dimension, as a symbol of national pride and unity. 

Tensions reached a peak in 2013-14. Indeed, the IPoE published its final report in 2013, just 5 days after Ethiopia started diverting the Blue Nile in order to advance the construction. Egypt therefore left the negotiations, claiming that IPoE measures had not been implemented. Indeed, Ethiopia refused to stop the construction during the IPoE assessment. In 2014 however, once the country had stabilised and a new regime had come to power, Egypt joined the negotiations again, realising that the dam was now a fact and that there was more to lose by walking away. To me, this represents a turning point. Indeed, Egypt implicitly accepts the existence of the GERD, despite the crucial importance of the Nile for practical and symbolic reasons, and the subject of the negotiation shifts from the construction of the dam, to its filling and operation.

In March 2015, a Declaration of Principle was signed in Khartoum. However, though this might seem like a great step towards a more comprehensive agreement, Dr. Rawia Tawfik warns that it is above all a political statement, which lacks the technical details necessary to come to an agreement over the filling and construction. Moreover, Ethiopia retains a right to adapt the dam to unforeseen circumstances, whereas Egypt sees it as an implicit acknowledgement of its ‘historical right’ to Nile water. Almost a year later, they finally agreed on two French engineering firms to conduct a risk assessment on the GERD. Again, Ethiopia refused to halt the construction during this assessment.

Finally, after a slight decrease of tensions in 2018 after the AU summit, negotiations under the observation of the US and the World Bank led to a Joint Statement in January 2020. However, the US-drafted agreement was seen by Ethiopia as biased towards Egypt. It claimed that the US overstepped their role and demanded that the issue be addressed according to the CFA, which Egypt has not signed. In July of that year, negotiations restarted under the observation of the AU. However, Ethiopia already started filling the dam, despite no agreement being reached, and despite a clause in the 2015 DoP stating that all three countries should agree to start the filling. This last move therefore added to the distrust and brought Egypt and Ethiopia even further from each other.

To me, one of the core issues is the framework under which Egypt and Ethiopia wish to negotiate. While Ethiopia views the CFA as the legitimate agreement over use of the Nile, Egypt has not signed it and relies on the 1959 agreement to protect its ‘historical rights’ of access to the Nile. Both therefore rely on the text that is most advantageous to them, in line with their vision of the Nile as part of the national identity of their respective country. Adding to that is a lack of trust and confidence, also linked with their history and national identities. According to Gebresenbet and Wondemagegnehu, there is a need for trust-building work between the two nations, before any agreement can be considered. My next question then is: since Ethiopia has already started filling the dam, and tensions have been escalating for two decades, isn’t it too late? Are Ethiopia’s and Egypt’s positions still reconcilable?