Why cooperation? A benefit-sharing approach to the GERD

Today, I want to look at a topic not directly related to the GERD, but crucial to understanding the true impact it could have on the region if a proper agreement can be reached. In other words, why is it so important that Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan come to an agreement on the GERD? Apart from the obvious benefits of avoiding war and preserving each country’s water security, there are many advantages of establishing a comprehensive framework to manage Nile waters, which could go much further than the water itself. Sadoff and Grey (2002) have categorised the potential benefits of collaboration for riparian countries:


  1. Benefits to the river: cooperation leads to a better protection of the ecosystem and a more sustainable use of the water. 

  1. Benefits from the river: increased food or energy production linked with the dam (or other projects).

  2. Reduction of costs because of the river: agreement on water management leads to less tensions overall and forms the basis for future collaboration.

  3. Benefits beyond the river: regional integration in other areas, such as trade, energy, infrastructure… increasing interdependencies between countries.


According to Sadoff and Grey (2002), a deal on water management automatically fosters collaboration in other sector. However, Tawfik argues that the link between these different types of cooperation is not obvious. Indeed, cooperation on water management does not automatically lead to integration in other areas, but it also does not always seem to be a necessary condition for cooperation in other areas. Looking at Eastern Nile countries, I would agree with her argument.


Indeed, focusing on the relationship between Egypt and Ethiopia, no cooperation seems possible without a deal on the GERD, and even if there were one, cooperation beyond the river is not guaranteed. As Tawfik explains, Egypt sees cooperation in a very utilitarian manner, namely as a way to create interdependencies with neighbouring countries and increase the cost for them of negatively affecting Egypt’s water security. This nationally centered view does not seem like a good basis for healthy cooperation. On the other hand, Ethiopia has a deep mistrust towards Egypt, stemming from their different views on the appropriate framework of negotiation (1959 agreement or CFA), and the support that Egypt grants to rebel groups within Ethiopia. Collaboration is therefore compromised, even in the case of a water deal.


However, Sudan has managed to collaborate with its neighbours before a water deal was signed. For example, although not fully implemented, a Four Freedoms agreement was signed with Egypt in 2004, and recent efforts to create interdependencies with Ethiopia have been quite successful. This could be linked with Sudan’s position as the middle-man, not making the decisions about the GERD, but also not the most at risk of adverse effects, which enables it to deal with both parties without threatening them. Sudan has also made efforts to craft its own position in the debate, moving away from Egypt and closer to Ethiopia, but remaining cautious about the potential risks of the GERD.


It therefore seems like Sudan is the country most on the way to accessing the four types of benefits described above. For Ethiopia and Egypt, the GERD issue needs to be solved, and trust built between the two parties, before considering further cooperation.

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