Lecture by Dr Marina Ottaway: a historical perspective on Nile water management



Today, I attended a lecture by Dr Marina Ottaway, as part of UCLA’s webinar series ‘Nile River Basin in Crisis’, and wanted to share my thoughts about it. She mostly focused on the historical context and the impacts of political developments in Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, which I thought would be a very relevant topic for my second post.


What struck me in her lecture, is that all three countries were mentioned separately, as if they were not interdependent in the past. And in a way, it is true. Egypt has kept full control over Nile waters since its independence. Current allocation of water between Egypt and Sudan is still based on an agreement negotiated in 1959, which only allowed them a share of 25% of Blue Nile water, while the other 75% goes to Egypt. However, as Dr Ottaway explained, this never led to major tensions between them, because Sudan was unable to use its share of the water anyway (due to a lack of technical capacity and a reliance on rain-fed agriculture). Colonial remnants also play a part. Indeed, Egypt had hoped that Sudanese territory would remain under its control after the British had left. While this did not happen, Egypt did keep a strong influence over Sudan, at least as long as Gamal Abd-el Nasser was in power (until 1970). 


Ethiopia also did not become a major player in the region before the 1990s. According to Dr Ottaway, Selassie’s main focus was not economic development, and while the location of a possible dam on the Blue Nile was always clear, it did not become a serious project until 1991 and the accession to power of Meles Zenawi and the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Ethiopia indeed sees the dam as a huge opportunity to develop itself through the production and export of hydropower, while countering Egyptian hegemony. On the other hand, Egypt feels threatened by the dam, as it would give Ethiopia power over 90% of the water it uses.


Another very interesting point was the differentiation Dr Ottaway made between irrigation dams (which lead to water being taken out of the river) and hydroelectric dams (which do affect the quantity of water available). As the GERD is a hydroelectric dam, it should not have such a major impact on the river flow downstream on the long term. The main issue for Egypt and Sudan is therefore the initial filling of the reservoir, which will significantly impact the flow. 


The main questions for me at this point therefore are: what will actually be the impact of the dam for all three countries? What cooperation efforts have been made so far and why have they failed? What can Egypt actually do now that the dam has been built? Who are the other actors involved in this conflict and what is their influence?

Comments

  1. Clement25 November 2021 at 12:49

    Nice summary of the lecture, and the questions you have come up with are very important.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Water and Politics in Africa29 November 2021 at 14:43

      Thank you, I hope my future posts provide some answer to these questions!

      Delete

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